Soft landing in sight, but not yet achieved
Despite durably high inflation and an aggressive monetary tightening cycle, activity was solid in 2023, with household consumption and public spending in particular driving growth. In 2024, growth is set to weaken as the effects of restrictive monetary policy persist and, in some cases, intensify. Rising delinquencies on auto loans and credit cards, for example, suggest consumers are starting to feel the pinch of higher interest costs. As a result, the contribution of household spending is likely to weaken, all the more so as support from the stock of excessive savings accumulated during the pandemic, which has now largely run its course, is also likely to wane. However, household spending should remain buoyed by income growth, thanks to a resilient job market (unemployment rate at 3.7% at the end of 2023). Real incomes should also benefit from moderating inflation. After a marked decline to 3.4% year-on-year by the end of 2023 from the peak of 9.1% reached in mid-2022, inflation should converge more slowly towards the Federal Reserve's (Fed) 2% target. The Fed is therefore likely to be cautious before cutting its target rate range, currently at 5.25%-5.50%, which is the highest level since 2001. However, progress made towards meeting the inflation target and the expected moderation in activity should allow the Fed to begin a rate-cutting cycle in the middle of the year. These rate cuts would stimulate residential investment in the second half of the year. Nevertheless, financial conditions will remain restrictive in 2024 and weigh on corporate spending. Incentives to invest in clean energy and semiconductors should continue to keep investment afloat. While public spending was buoyant in 2023, it is likely to be more cautious this year. Rising interest charges on debt and divergent views on fiscal policy in Washington, especially in an election year, will limit federal spending. State and local governments, on the other hand, will continue to implement federal investment programmes, including infrastructure, thus maintaining a positive contribution from public spending. The surprising boost to activity from net exports in 2023 is likely to run out of steam, on back of the delayed effects of a strong dollar.
Fiscal deficit stabilises at a high level
Falling government revenues following atypical growth in the previous fiscal year, and rising debt servicing costs contributed to a widening deficit in 2022-23. In the current fiscal year, the deficit is expected to narrow again, although it will remain well above the deficits recorded prior to the Covid-19 crisis. Under the Fiscal Responsibility Act of June 2023, which ended the debt ceiling crisis, non-defence discretionary spending would therefore remain unchanged. In addition, a divided Congress is also likely to hamper the passage of major legislation, limiting new spending. Expenditures on Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, however, will continue to be driven by baby-boomer retirements. In addition, given the international context, aid to Israel and Ukraine could be revised upwards. Interest charges, which reached 2.5% of GDP in 2023 (1.6% in 2020), will also continue to weigh. Although the debt burden is heavy, the authorities remain in a position to meet their financial obligations given the country’s unrivalled financing flexibility thanks to its status as issuer of the USD, the world's main reserve currency. However, the last-minute agreement to raise the debt ceiling in 2023 to avoid default demonstrated that politicisation of the debt limit is a recurring pitfall. This was one of the risks cited by Fitch to justify downgrading the credit rating of US debt to AA+ in August 2023.
The current account deficit will remain high in 2023, fuelled mainly by the structural deficit in the merchandise balance (3.9% of GDP in 2023). It should moderate, however, as goods imports slow in line with domestic demand. New liquefied natural gas production capacity will support exports, particularly to Europe. After experiencing significant movements linked to disruptions in transport services in recent years, the surplus on the services account should remain stable at around 1% of GDP. The positive primary income balance (0.7% of GDP) is expected to improve slightly, as receipts from interest and deposits on US assets abroad increase. International cooperation transfers and remittances will keep the transfer balance in deficit (around 0.6% of GDP). The attractiveness of US assets and the USD is generating portfolio investments (Treasury bills, equities, etc.) to finance the deficit.
2024 elections set against a backdrop of high-running domestic and international tension
Democrat Joe Biden became President in January 2021 after a tumultuous transition marked by the storming of the Capitol on 6 January by supporters of his predecessor, Republican Donald Trump. Barring a major surprise, the November 2024 elections are shaping up to be a rematch of the duel between the last two presidents. Despite questions surrounding his age and health, Joe Biden remains the most credible alternative on the Democrat side. On the Republican side, Donald Trump has begun the primaries holding a comfortable advantage in the polls. The numerous legal proceedings against him, notably for his role in the events of 6 January 2021, should not prevent him from running, but will punctuate the campaign. Divergent political orientations are likely to fuel uncertainty in what promises to be a tight presidential race. The race for control of the House of Representatives and the Senate will also be intense and could result in a divided Congress. In a polarised political context, the political leanings of the candidates point to divergent outlooks on domestic and foreign policy.
In an environment of heightened technological competition, and with tensions in the China Sea remaining high, rivalry with China continues to dominate US foreign policy and is likely to remain a priority whatever the outcome of the November elections. At the same time, the war in Ukraine has reinforced the Biden administration's efforts to revive the US presence in multilateral institutions and is underscoring the drive to re-engage with diplomatic, security and economic partners, particularly in Europe, as opposed to the Trump administration’s approach. Under a Biden administration - like Trump's - the long-standing alliance with Israel, particularly in the context of the war against Hamas, would most likely be preserved.